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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE '80's:
REFLECTIONS ON THE SYMPOSIUM*
RICHARD LEMPERT**

I.

LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVES

Looking at this, the first major symposium treating capital punishment as it is administered in the post-Gregg' era, one is struck by both
the ways in which this body of scholarship resembles the work of the
pre-Furman2 era and by the ways in which it is different. The most striking difference lies in the concerns of the legal scholars. The big issue
that so concerned an earlier generation-the constitutionality of the
death penalty given the eighth amendment and evolving standards of
decency-is nowhere directly addressed. Instead, the task that lawyers
in the symposium set themselves is to identify constitutional deficiencies
in the way that people are selected for death and to suggest ways that
these deficiencies may be corrected.
The result is a body of work that is decidedly ameliorative. Thus,
Professor Strafer does not use his powerful description of conditions on
death row to argue that a penalty system that entails such conditions
should be abolished. Rather, he uses it to support the position that the
condemned should not be allowed to "volunteer" for execution by refusing to pursue appeals. If the argument is accepted, perhaps a few lives a
decade will be saved. The same can be said about the case that Professor White makes for attaching a fifth amendment privilege to statements
made in psychiatric examinations.
Perhaps the starkest contrast between the old and new perspective
is found in that work which focuses on disparities in sentencing people
to death. Contrast the work of Professor Goodpaster and Professors
Baldus, Pulaski and Woodworth in this issue with that of Charles
* Work on this paper was supported by the Cook Funds of the University of Michigan
Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D., University of Michigan,
1971; J.D., University of Michigan, 1968; A.B., Oberlin College, 1964.
1 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Black. 3 For Professor Black, the "arbitrary and capricious" nature of
the system was enough to condemn it,4 but for Goodpaster and Baldus
and his colleagues the challenge that arbitrariness poses is as much technical as moral, and the scholar's task is not to condemn the system but
to develop a technology that will enable it to escape condemnation.
Here, however, the suggested reforms may save the lives of hundreds of
condemned men and women. Then again, as I shall suggest shortly,
they may not.
In some circles, to characterize the goals of scholarship as "ameliorative" is to criticize or condemn. Certainly those opposed to the death
penalty may be disappointed to find that powerful criticisms of the current system end not in a legal or moral case against capital punishment
but in suggestions for reform. Yet there are good reasons for the authors
to take the positions they do, even if, as is suggested by the writing of
some, they are adamantly opposed to capital punishment. Lawyers are
practical people, and Gregg v. Georgia,5 together with its progeny, have,
at least for the moment, resolved the fundamental eighth amendment
issue. Death as a penalty is not per se cruel and unusual, and there is no
chance that the current Supreme Court or the Congress is going to overrule Gregg and say that it is. The only ideas likely to influence courts
and forestall the execution of some are ameliorative ones, and, totally
apart from lives saved, there is virtue in procedural fairness.
II.

SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES

The movement to abolish the death penalty which led first to the
moratorium on executions in the 1960's and then to the Furman reprieve
of all those then on death row was fostered by a series of social science
studies that suggested that the death penalty was unfairly applied and
had no deterrent value. The social science papers in the current symposium are consistent with the earlier research, but their likely impact on
public opinion and elite decision makers is, as of this writing,
problematic.
Looking at the social science research one is struck largely by continuities with earlier work. Consistent with the bulk of earlier research,
no study finds substantial evidence of a deterrent effect. Forst's conclusion that "the deterrence theory may apply to most sanctions, but the
evidence indicates that the death penalty is an important exception"
could have been written by Schuessler in 19526 or by Sellin in almost
3 C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABLITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE

(1974).
4 Id.
5 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6 Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952).
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any of the studies he published during the fifties and sixties. 7
If one can dare to generalize from a small, nonrandom collection of
articles, it does appear that certain concerns and methods will be more
fully represented in future work on capital punishment than they have
8
been in the past. First, despite the fact that Isaac Ehrlich's results have
9
been substantially discredited, it appears that Ehrlich's views have prevailed in one respect. The bulk of the current research, including the
studies by McFarland, Bailey, and Forst in this issue, evaluates the deterrent effect of capital punishment by looking at actual executions
rather than at the inchoate threat of laws permitting capital punishment. Elsewhere I argue that one approach is not necessarily superior to
the other, and that we can better evaluate the effects of systems of capital punishment if we attend both to the existence of the death penalty
and to its actual implementation. 10 Thus, it is refreshing to see that one
article in this symposium, the piece by Archer, Gartner and Beittel, does
look at the dejure situation. However, I expect that dejitre studies, which
once dominated death penalty research, will continue to constitute but a
small fraction of the published work on deterrence.
Second, the articles by Bailey and McFarland suggest the continued vitality of the recent trend to look at the deterrent effects of the
death penalty on less aggregated bases than state or nationwide homicide rates.II The interest in disaggregation is not an entirely new phenomenon,1 2 but new statistical tools may mean that we can learn
considerably more from a closer look at executions than we have in the
past. At the same time we should be aware that random factors associated with particular executions, time periods, or areas may falsely suggest deterrent or brutalizaton effects. As we aggregate, random factors
associated with particular cases tend to cancel out.
Finally, consistent with Bowers and Pierce's work, 13 we see "rumors" of brutalization. Again, the finding is not unique to the most
recent research; abolitionist states typically had homicide rates lower
7 See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (r.

Sellin ed. 1967).

8 Ehrlich, The Deterrent Ejct of Capital Punishment: A Question ofLift and Death, 65 AM.
EcoN. REV. 397 (1975).

9 See Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177 (1981).

10 Lempert, The Eect ofExecutios on Homicides: A New Look in an Old Light, 29 CRIME &
DELINQ. 88 (1983).

11 See, e.g., King, The Brutalization Eect: Execution ublicity and the Incidence of Homicide in
South Carolina, 57 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978); Phillips, The Deterrent Eect of CapitalPunishment:
New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980).
12 See, e.g., Dann, The Deterrent Ejet of CapitalPunishment, 29 FRIENDS SOC. SERV. SERIES
1 (1935); Graves, A Doctor Looks at CapitalPunishment, 10 MED. ARTS & Sci. 137 (1956).
13 Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Eect of Executios?, 26 CRIME &
DELINQ. 453 (1980).
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than their contiguous death penalty neighbors, 14 and psychiatrists have
provided anecdotal accounts of brutalization.- 5 But when brutalization
effects emerge from sophisticated statistical analyses, the argument that
such effects do exist becomes more compelling. We are, however, not
yet compelled to accept the argument that capital punishment, on balance, takes more innocent lives than it saves, either by the work appearing in this issue or by that published elsewhere. The existence of net
brutalization effects is still to be established. Forst's conclusions in this
issue are much like a judgment I reached two years ago; namely, that if
brutalization effects exist, they are probably small and largely counterbalanced by small deterrent effects.' 6 Nevertheless, the matter is both
important to public policy and scientifically intriguing. Research into
brutalization should and no doubt will continue.
One may ask how the new research, with its consistent failure to
find a deterrent effect of the death penalty, is likely to affect public policy on the issue. I think it is unlikely that the research suggesting capital
punishment does not deter will have any substantial short term effect in
persuading decision makers, be they courts or legislatures, to abolish
capital punishment. In Gregg, retribution got equal billing with deterrence as a justification for capital punishment, 1 7 and the absence of deterrence does not destroy retributionist arguments. Furthermore, even if
the Supreme Court were to regard deterrence as the sole justification for
capital punishment, it is not likely that the Justices will find either in the
recent research or in research likely to be done over the next term evidence sufficiently comprehensive and conclusive for them to hold as a
18
matter of constitutional law that a state can never execute.
This does not mean, however, that the research lacks practical importance. In those abolitionist states that remain, research results like
those presented in this issue provide powerful evidence for proponents of
the status quo. Furthermore, in some states with the death penalty, experts have been allowed to testify in penalty trials on the deterrent effects of the death penalty. Thus, those studies that continue to search in
vain for a deterrent effect of death may in a small way contribute to the
preservation of the lives of individual defendants. Finally, the research
on deterrence may, if it continues to show no effect attributable to the
death penalty, help over the long run to shape a new consensus favoring
14 DEATH PENALTY (T. Sellin ed. 1959).

15 West, Pgychiatric Refletions on the Death Penalt, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 689
(1975).
16 See Lempert, supra note 9.
17 428 U.S. at 183.
18 Some questions, such as the question of whether capital punishment deters homicides
by those serving life sentences, pertain to such small numbers of homicides that social science
is unlikely ever to be able to provide a definite answer.
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the abolition of capital punishment. What is necessary for this to occur
is for the learning on deterrence to become public knowledge.' 9 It may
be that the increasingly sophisticated statistical designs that characterize
frontier research on this issue make the task of communication difficult,
and it is certainly the case that poorly designed research is likely to lead
to popular confusion. When poorly designed research shows a deterrent
effect, it is likely to be highly publicized even after it is discredited, and
if such research fails to show an effect, knowledge that it is discredited is
likely to confuse the public about the scientific status of all research that
reaches similar conclusions.
All this assumes that future research will, like the body of past research, fail to show any substantial association between the utilization of
the death penalty and homicide rates. If social science research should
reveal a consistent and significant brutalization effect, and if that finding were highlighted in the public mind by a highly publicized case or
two in which a killer explained a brutal murder by a desire to be executed, the effect on public policy is likely to be enormous. Legislatures
rather than courts could be expected to act so as to eliminate or severely
restrict punishment by death. If, on the other hand, future research
should show that the death penalty had a consistent and significant deterrent effect, abolitionist states would be unlikely to resist pressures for
capital punishment, and judges and juries would probably grow more
willing to sentence offenders to death.
One cannot state flatly that future research will not show a deterrent effect. To date there have been too few executions in the post-Gregg
period to allow aggregate statistical studies or to test fairly the deterrence hypothesis if one believes that actual executions are crucial to deterrence. Although the experience during the depression years is to the
contrary, it is not inconceivable that a massive wave of executions following the expiration or lifting of the legal barriers that have prevented
the executions of those now on death rows will have effects unlike those
we have heretofore experienced.20 Furthermore, supporters of the death
penalty can argue that the new capital punishment statutes are more
predictably or fairly applied than those they replaced and for this reason
are more likely to have a deterrent effect.
To recognize possibilities is not, however, to state probabilities.
19 Kalven, The Ouest for the Middle Range.: EmpiricalInquig and Legal Policy, in LAW IN A
CHANGING AMERICA 68 (G. Hazard ed. 1968).

20 The effects might be those of brutalization rather than deterrence. Furthermore, if substantial deterrent or brutalization effects were to be revealed, it is not clear that they would be
of great policy relevance. To the extent they are the result of a wave of executions following
the breaking of a legal logjam, they are unlikely to predict the deterrent or brutalization
effects of a routinized system of capital punishment.
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Given what we do know about the death penalty's effects on homicide
rates, and we know quite a bit, there is little reason to expect that the
effects of capital punishment will in the future be very different from
what they have been in the past. This is so even if the future is characterized by a sudden wave of executions or by the regular march of murderers to death. Although one can always speculate that tomorrow will
be different, recent research, including that published in this issue, only
serves to confirm my earlier conclusion that the failure of the death pen'2 1
alty to deter has been proven "to a moral certainty."
There is, however, a real possibility that deterrence research in the
1980's will falsely suggest a deterrent effect. The moratorium on capital
punishment in the 1960's and '70's coincided with a substantial rise in
homicide rates attributable, at least in part, to a large increase in the
number of male youth in the most crime-prone age groups. The renewed permission to execute has, by happenstance, coincided with a period when a general diminution in the crime rate can be expected
because of a drop in the number of male youth in the most violenceprone years. To the extent that population age trends overlap with increased execution rates, it will be difficult to untangle fully the effects on
the propensity to violence that criminologists confidently attribute to
age from the effects that deterrence theorists would like to attribute to
the application of the death penalty. In particular, it will be relatively
easy for unscrupulous or incompetent social scientists to come up with
aggregate results that suggest executions substantially deter. Thus,
there is a good social science reason to applaud the success of those lawyers who are working to postpone the executions of those now on death
row. The longer the onset of a period of regular executions can be
delayed, the better our ultimate ability to separate the deterrent effects
of capital punishment from effects attributable to the country's changing age structure.
The final set of social science papers, by Paternoster, Bowers,
Radelet and Vandiver, and Baldus, Pulaski and Woodworth deals with
inconsistencies and discrimination in selecting murderers for death. The
basic findings of inconsistency and discrimination are familiar, harking
back to a study Garfinkel published in 1949.22 Interestingly, both Paternoster and Baldus and his coauthors replicate Garfinkel's basic finding
in that they locate discrimination in the application of the death penalty
not primarily in the race of the defendant but in the race of the victim.
This finding is consistent with other research, some of which also finds
that there is an interaction between the race of the victim and the race
21
22

Lempert, supra note 9, at 1222.
Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-RacialHomicides, 27 Soc.

FORCEs

369 (1949).
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of defendants such that blacks with white victims are most likely to be
23
executed and whites with black victims are least likely to be so treated.
In addition, Paternoster, Bowers, and Baldus and his colleagues, like
Bowers and Pierce before them, 24 find that the location in which a case
is tried affects the probability that a defendant will receive the death
penalty. Offenders have a better chance of escaping death in urban
courts than in rural ones.
The now oft-replicated finding of the importance of the race of the
victim is important because it explains a fact that some people have
found puzzling; namely that black murderers do not appear more likely
to be sentenced to death than white ones. 25 Racial values do affect
death penalty decisions, but they are most salient with respect to the
victim. In other words, greater retribution is demanded when whites
are victims than when blacks are victims because the white dominated
26
society values innocent white lives more than innocent black ones.
Furthermore, if as is clearly true in the case of rape 27 and as may be
true, in some regions at least, in the case of homicide, 2 8 the racial configuration of the victim-defendant pair affects the demand for retribution,
black defendants with white victims have suffered (and whites with
black victims have benefited) because of their race. The results reported
in this issue by Bowers on the one hand and Paternoster and Baldus and
his coauthors on the other do not resolve the question whether such "interactive" discrimination continues to be important. If it does, it can be
particularly difficult to spot. Table 1 presents hypothetical data that
illustrates the basic point.
We see from the third and sixth columns that eighteen percent of
all black murderers and eighteen percent of all white murderers are sentenced to death. Thus, the overall figures convey not the slightest hint of
discrimination. Yet blacks must be suffering on account of their race,
23 See id.; Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrarinessand Discriminationunder Post- Furman CapitalStatutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Radelet, Racial Characteristicsand the Imposition of the
Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 918 (1981); Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, JudicialDiscretion, and
the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 19 (1973).

24 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 23, at 607.
25 Kleck, RacialDiscriminationin CriminalSentencing: A CriticalEvaluation of the Evidence with
Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783 (1981).
26 If the data showed that white victims were more likely to be strangers, or more likely to
be killed brutally, or more likely to be killed during the course of other felonies than blacks,
whether the killer was white or black, this conclusion would not hold and there would be an
acceptable legal reason for the disparity. However, while whites killed at the hands of blacks
are more likely to be strangers or victims of felony murders than blacks killed by blacks, the
reverse is true when killers are white. Furthermore, as we see from the work in this issue, the
pattern of demanding greater retribution when victims are white persists, although it is not as
strong, when important legal variables are controlled.
27 Wolfgang & Riedel, supra note 23.
28 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 23.
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because blacks who kill whites are more likely to be sentenced to death
than whites who kill whites, and blacks who kill blacks are more likely to
be sentenced to death than whites who kill blacks. The apparent anomaly by which clearly discriminatory practices aggregate to a pattern of
nondiscrimination is explained by two factors. The first is that intraracial homicide is more common than interracial homicide, and the
second is that the death penalty is more likely to be demanded when
victims are of one race rather than the other. When such patterns exist,
as they apparently do in the case of homicide, one must be careful about
drawing conclusions of no discrimination from aggregate data.
These data are, to be sure, hypothetical, but the fact that executions are more common when whites are victims now seems well documented, and there is at least some evidence that blacks with white
victims are treated especially harshly, as well as reason to believe that
29
whites with black victims are somewhat advantaged.
Here is the stuff with which a constitutional challenge to the death
penalty can be raised. The Supreme Court in Furman was fundamentally concerned with the fairness with which people are selected for
death, and Gregg seems to be based largely on the supposition that the
new death penalty statutes are carefully tailored to their objectives and
capable of being consistently applied. If it can be shown that the
chances that one will be sentenced to death are crucially affected by
whether one has killed in a farming community or an urban area, even
those Justices most prone to hold the death penalty to be constitfitional
are likely to be troubled. If it can be unequivocally shown that race,
whether of the criminal or the victim, is crucial in determining who,
from among an equally heinous group of offenders, are selected for
death, it is unlikely that any but the most narrowly drawn death penalty
statutes will survive constitutional scrutiny.
There were studies of discrimination in the application of the death
penalty before Furman, but when the hope was that the Court would
answer the fundamental moral question, deterrence studies that bore on
the utility of the death penalty seemed to be of greater policy relevance.
Furman signified that they were not, for the Court in Furman was more
concerned with the apparent arbitrariness of death sentencing than with
its likely deterrent effect. After Gregg, the area of prime policy relevance
is clearer still. What most matters are procedures. Only by showing
that the death penalty is inescapably and invidiously arbitrary is social
29 Much of the available evidence pertains to the Southern states. Given the racial history of the region, one might not expect strong patterns of discrimination to prevail in Northem states. However, since the South today is apparently far more willing to sentence to death
than other regions, discrimination confined to the South potentially affects a high proportion
of those realistically threatened with execution.
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science likely to have an immediate effect on the ongoing constitutional
debate.
Thus, it would appear that research results like those reported by
Bowers, Paternoster, Radelet and Vandiver, and Baldus, Pulaski and
Woodworth provide the social science backdrop for the most promising
of the constitutional arguments that can be brought to bear against the
new systems of capital punishment. This judgment is apparently shared
by some of those litigating on behalf of capital defendants, for Radelet
and Vandiver's work was funded in part by the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, and Paternoster reports that the cooperation of
a member of the South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense was essential to his efforts. Yet there is lurking in this strategy a potential threat
to the interests of those adamantly opposed to capital punishment. As
reactions to Furman showed, supporters of the death penalty can be as
passionately attached to their position as opponents are to theirs. If systems of capital punishment appear vulnerable because they are not consistently applied, one way to increase consistency and preserve a
punishment that is dear to so many is to capture more people in the
death penalty net.
While Baldus and his coauthors reveal important inconsistencies in
selecting murderers to die, from another perspective their analysis is remarkable for the consistency it shows. Their data certainly do not suggest the kind of haphazard selection for death that before Furman was
thought common. Furthermore, the inconsistency that does exist in
death sentencing in Georgia results more from the presence of eminently
death-eligible defendants who escape the death sentence than it does
from numbers of less culpable offenders being ideosyncratically sentenced to die. If to keep the death penalty for those regarded as most
deserving, death must be sought for murderers who ordinarily would
not be subject to capital punishment, prosecutors and legislators may
regard this as a small price to pay.
Indeed, this has probably happened. Professor Zeisel tells us that in
an apparent response to research suggesting the discriminatory application of the death penalty in Florida, state prosecutors sought and
achieved, for the first time since reconstruction, a death sentence for a
white convicted of killing a black. 30 Indeed, two such sentences were
sought before one stuck. So interested were the prosecutors in filling in
the "black victim-white defendant" box in our execution table that they
first sought and obtained a death sentence for a white who, had he killed
a fellow white, would never have been sentenced capitally. The Florida
30 Zeisel, Race Biasin the Administration of the Death Penalty. The FloridaExperience, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 456 (1981).
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Supreme Court had no choice but to reverse and the prosecutors had to
try again.
If prosecutors seek to resolve those racial disparities that turn on the
victim's race by consciously supressing this factor in deciding whether to
seek death, the overwhelming number of those who suffer for it will be
blacks. The reason is that most killers with black victims are themselves
black, so any increase in the death penalty rate for those who kill blacks
will fall disproportionately on black defendants. This is likely to be true
even if discrimination on the basis of the defendent's race is at the same
time eliminated, for in the decision to seek death the influence of the
victim's race is more substantial than the effect of the defendant's. Consider, for example, Table 2, which is a hypothetical illustration but
which uses data drawn from Paternoster's Table 1 on the frequency
with which South Carolina prosecutors in capital cases seek the death
penalty. Let us assume that the rate at which prosecutors sought death
for all defendant-victim combinations was the rate at which death was
in fact sought when both defendants and victims were white. This assumption eliminates what is in the uncontrolled data an apparent interaction effect between the race of defendants and victims, for blacks who
kill whites are about twenty-five percent more likely to face death penalty requests than whites who kill whites. 3 ' Despite the eliminination of
this disparity, the number of blacks facing death penalty requests under
a system that did not attend to the victim's race would increase by seventeen percent. Furthermore, South Carolina defines capital murder so
as to exclude far more black-black killings than white-white ones. If this
were not the case, the increase in blacks for whom death was sought
would be far more dramatic.
For prosecutors to respond to the burgeoning evidence of discrimination by seeking death more frequently in cases involving black victims
is immoral if it is done to preserve the death penalty, and it should be
unconstitutional as well. Mandatory capital sanctions for homicide are
unconstitutional. Defendants must have an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation. Thus, the appropriate occasions for the death penalty are to be defined within parameters set forth by the legislature but
with reference to the community's sense (as evidenced by the prosecutor,
judge and jury) of when the capital sanction is appropriate. Under
none of the moral arguments that have been advanced in favor of capital punishment is it permissible to execute someone who would not
31 Whites who kill blacks are, in Paternoster's study, also more likely to be the subject of
death penalty requests than whites who kill whites, but the numbers on which this figure is
based are so small that the percentages are likely to be quite unstable.
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otherwise be killed simply because his execution is necessary to the
maintenance of a system for executing others. The constitutional situation seems similar. The death penalty is justified, according to the
Court in Gregg, for reasons of deterrence and retribution. To sentence
individuals to death and to increase greatly the number of people sentenced to death simply to create an appearance of fairness is to demand
death for a purpose that is nowhere constitutionally sanctioned.
Thus, the ongoing social science research into the equity of the capital sanction has another purpose, to establish a baseline-before the
system begins to react to its findings-of the kinds of cases in which
capital punishment is thought appropriate. If a system of capital punishment that is more lenient with killers of blacks than with killers of
whites will not pass constitutional or moral muster, then the task for
proponents of the death penalty is to identify those crimes so heinous
that even killers of blacks are punished capitally. Only in these situations can we be certain that American race consciousness has not played
a role in identifying the subset of capital murderers selected for death.
Of course, it is possible that an appropriate subset of heinous crimes
can never be adequately identified. An ironical implication of the work
done on discrimination and the death penalty is that any punishment
system that is humane-in the sense that the human instinct for mercy
has some place in it- will never achieve the kind of equality of application that fairness in the eyes of third parties, including the courts, demands. Professor Black's thesis that the selection of murderers for death
is inescapably arbitrary and capricious 32 may turn out to be correct not
for the worst of reasons but for the best. The disparities that persist after
Gregg may in large part be due not to systemic failings such as the presence of racial prejudice or prosecutorial vindictiveness, but to the simpler and ineluctable fact that it is humans who sentence and who are
sentenced to death. The human interaction between sentencer and sentenced, and the capacity to grow indignant or suppress indignation that
may arise from that interaction, are likely to remain no matter how
standardized sentencing procedures become.
I suspect that the relationship researchers have found between the
victim's race and the capital sanction results from a simple fact. Whites,
who as judges, prosecutors and jurors dominate the death sentencing
process, cannot help feeling more indignation upon learning that a
white (like them) has been killed than they do when there is a black
victim. This extra indignation may suppress what would otherwise be
an instinct for mercy. There is little point in labeling such reactions and
similar same race preferences by blacks with the pejorative "racism."
32 C. BLACK, supra note 3.
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They are simply part of what it is to be human in a race-conscious society. But to execute one whose victim is white when he would have been
spared had his victim been black is intolerable in a system that demands
equality and fairness, however understandable or even admirable the
process that led to the distinction. At the same time, achieving equality
by suppressing what is most human about us and executing on the basis
of hard data that neither reflects individualized judgments of the heinousness of the offense and offender nor allows for feelings of mercy
seems equally intolerable. In such a system people will be killed not
because those who hear their cases think they deserve to die but because
the sentencers think that others do. If capital punishment is to endure,
the measures must be reversed. Where differences between offenders
cannot be articulated or, as with the race of victim data, cannot withstand articulation, the more merciful disposition must control. If such a
standard were faithfully applied we would soon find that capital punishment was confined to a small subset of the most heinous offenders.
Other options are to turn a blind eye to the inequalities that permeate
the system or to so increase the rate at which we sentence people to
death that the state infliction of death will be, literally, an everyday
occurrence. Or we may recognize that retribution by death inescapably
conflicts with other deeply held and more civilized values, and for this
reason we may cease to inflict it.

